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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------X
LOANSTREET, INC., and IAN LAMPL,
Individually,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,

21 Civ. 6166 (NRB)

- against –
WYATT TROIA, Individually,
Defendant.
------------------------------X
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

LoanStreet Inc. (“LoanStreet” or the “Company”) operates an
online platform that allows users to share, manage, and originate
loans.

Wyatt

Troia

was

employed

as

a

software

engineer

at

LoanStreet from February 2019 until June 12, 2020, when he was
fired from the Company, allegedly for cause.

Throughout 2020 and

2021,

different

Troia

posted

statements

on

several

websites

disparaging LoanStreet and its CEO Ian Lampl, accusing them of
unlawfully withholding stock options owed to Troia and other
improper

employment

practices.

LoanStreet

discovered

Troia’s

posts and attempted to resolve the matter consensually. When those
attempts failed, LoanStreet and Lampl brought suit against Troia,
asserting seven causes of action: breach of contract, defamation
per se, defamation, injurious falsehood, unfair competition and
false designation of origin under Lanham Act Section 43(a), common
law unfair competition, and permanent injunctive relief.

See
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Complaint, ECF No. 3.

Presently before the Court is defendant’s

motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) and lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1). For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion is granted
in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and are
accepted

as

true

for

the

purposes

defendant’s motion to dismiss.
LoanStreet

Inc.,

an

online

of

the

Court’s

ruling

on

In 2013, Ian Lampl co-founded
platform

that

allows

financial

institutions and other users to share, manage, and originate loans.
Compl. ¶¶ 11-12.

In February 2019, LoanStreet hired Wyatt Troia

as a software engineer.

Id. ¶ 17.

Troia’s term of employment

officially commenced the following month.

Id. ¶¶ 17, 23.

In

addition to a six-figure salary and standard benefits, Troia was
granted options to purchase LoanStreet’s common stock pursuant to
the Company’s 2016 Equity Incentive Plan and stock option grant
agreement.

Id. ¶ 19.

Under the agreement, Troia’s options would

vest on the first anniversary of his vesting commencement date, if
he was still employed by LoanStreet at that time.

Id.

Troia

received two option grants, the first on July 22, 2019 to purchase
885 shares of common stock, and the second on January 15, 2020 to
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purchase 500 shares of common stock.
its own vesting schedule.

Id.

Id. ¶ 20.

Each grant had

As a condition of his employment,

Troia executed an Employee Non-Disclosure and Invention Assignment
Agreement (“NDIAA”).

Id. ¶ 22.

On June 12, 2020, LoanStreet

terminated Troia’s employment, allegedly for, among other things,
“the poor quality of his engineering, his lack of engagement with
his team, and his inability to cooperate with his peers or take
direction from his superiors.”

Id. ¶ 27.

Between April and June 2020 — while Troia was still employed
by LoanStreet — and then again starting in June 2021, Troia posted
disparaging

statements

about

LoanStreet,

Lampl,

and

other

LoanStreet employees on various websites across the Internet,
including on Glassdoor.com, Reddit.com, and Teamblind.com.
24-26, 33, 34-38, 42-44.

Id. ¶¶

Troia’s grievances centered on the

accusation that LoanStreet and/or Lampl cheated Troia out of
$100,000

in

stock

options.

For

example,

Troia

wrote

on

Glassdoor.com — a job website that aggregates company reviews,
salary information, and other employer intel — that “[b]ased on
Lampl’s valuation goal for the company, he defrauded me out of
over $100k.”

Id. ¶¶ 36-37.

In addition, on the day of Troia’s

firing, he sent a company-wide message via Slack, followed by an
identical e-mail sent to Lampl with the entire Company copied,
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“call[ing] the Company and its leadership into disrepute,” and
stating that he would “be doing [his] best to warn all potential
future employees to avoid LoanStreet.”

Id. ¶¶ 27-28, 30.

Troia took various steps to magnify the reach of his posts.
In the body of the posts, he asked users to “follow [his] link and
mark it as helpful so that the message is amplified and as many
people are warned as possible.”

Id. ¶ 42.

Troia also tagged the

personal LinkedIn profiles of LoanStreet employees on the posts,
which spurred a flurry of hate messages sent directly to the
employees.

Id. ¶ 41.

Finally, Troia took the additional and

distinct step of purchasing advertisements on Google linked to the
LoanStreet name, so that when users searched for LoanStreet in
Google’s search engine, they were shown advertisements displaying
excerpts

from

Troia’s

disparaging posts.

statements

and

linking

to

Troia’s

Id. ¶¶ 48-49.

On June 24, 2021, LoanStreet served Troia with a letter
demanding that he retract all defamatory statements and cease
publishing any others.

Id. ¶¶ 57-58.

Troia rebuffed LoanStreet’s

attempt to resolve the matter consensually. Id. ¶ 59. Thereafter,
on July 19, 2021, LoanStreet and Lampl commenced this action.

As

of the date of the writing of this opinion, Troia’s statements
remain accessible online.
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LEGAL STANDARDS
Defendant moves to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim and Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6).

“When

presented with motions to dismiss pursuant to both Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6), ‘the Court must first analyze the Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to determine whether the Court has the subject matter
jurisdiction necessary to consider the merits of the action.’”
Khodeir v. Sayyed, No. 15 Civ. 8763 (DAB), 2016 WL 5817003, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (quoting S.E.C. v. Rorech, 673 F. Supp.
2d 217, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)); see Town of West Hartford v.
Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The question of
subject matter jurisdiction must be confronted at the threshold of
the case.”).
A.

Rule 12(b)(1)
Plaintiffs

maintain

that

this

Court

has

subject

matter

jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal
question), 1332 (diversity of citizenship), and 1338 (trademark).
Compl. ¶ 8.

Defendant’s rebuttal has two components.

Defendant

first argues that there is no federal question jurisdiction because
plaintiffs have failed to state a viable Lanham Act claim, the
only federal claim asserted in the Complaint.

Defendant then

argues that in the absence of a valid federal claim, subject matter
-5-
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jurisdiction is lacking because the parties are not diverse. 1
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1)
(“Mot.”) at 2, ECF No. 27.
To determine whether federal question jurisdiction exists,
“it is not necessary to decide whether [the] alleged cause of
action . . . is in fact a cause of action ‘on which [the plaintiff]
could actually recover.’”

Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d at 100

(quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 70 (1978)); see Monroe v. Hyundai of Manhattan and
Westchester, No. 07 Civ. 8777 (GBD), 2008 WL 4891223, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008) (“Federal question jurisdiction is not
dependent on the existence of a valid federal claim.”).

Rather,

as the Second Circuit has explained:
[I]n cases where the asserted basis for subject matter
jurisdiction is also an element of the plaintiff’s
allegedly federal cause of action, we ask only whether—
on its face—the complaint is drawn so as to seek recovery
under federal law or the Constitution. If so, then we
assume or find a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, and
reserve further scrutiny for an inquiry on the merits.
Defendant argues that the parties are not diverse because plaintiffs are
domiciled in New York and so is he. Mot. at 22-23. Plaintiffs assert that
defendant’s true domicile is Nebraska. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Complaint (“Opp.”) at 24-35, ECF No. 32. For
the reasons explained herein, the Court need not resolve this dispute. Still,
the Court notes that if, as plaintiffs maintain, defendant has refused to be
deposed on the issue of domicile or to produce any tax returns or utility bills,
it would be difficult if not impossible for the Court to resolve the issue of
diversity.
1
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Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1189 (2d
Cir. 1996).

“As long as the federal claim is colorable, a court

properly assumes jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.”
Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1996); see Duke
Power, 438 U.S. at 70-71 (stating that in federal question cases,
“the test is whether the cause of action alleged is so patently
without merit as to justify . . . the court’s dismissal for want
of jurisdiction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here,

plaintiffs

assert

a

cause

of

action

for

unfair

competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A),
arising from defendant’s use and public display of plaintiffs’
trademark in several advertisements purchased via Google.

These

allegations easily hurdle the low bar required for federal question
jurisdiction.
B.

As such, defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) arguments fail. 2

Rule 12(b)(6)
To

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss

under

Rule

12(b)(6),

“a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“The assessment of

Because subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1131, the Court
need not, and does not, address the disputed issue of diversity jurisdiction.
For the same reason, the Court also does not address defendant’s arguments
regarding supplemental jurisdiction.
2
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whether a complaint’s factual allegations plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief ‘does not impose a probability requirement
at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’”
unlawful conduct.

Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d

Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference
alleged.”).

that

the

defendant

is

liable

for

the

misconduct

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts

must “construe all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Arar

v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
for defamation and defamation per se, injurious falsehood, and
unfair competition under both federal and state law. 3

The Court

addresses each argument in turn.
A.

Defamation
“To state a claim for defamation under New York law, a

plaintiff must allege that the defendant made a statement that

3

Defendant does not move to dismiss plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.
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was: (1) false, defamatory, and of and concerning the plaintiff;
(2) published to a third party; (3) made with the applicable level
of fault; and (4) defamatory per se or caused the plaintiff special
harm.”

Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Bleeping Computer LLC,

194 F. Supp. 3d 263, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Chandok v.
Klessig, 632 F.3d 803, 814 (2d Cir. 2011)).

Plaintiffs identify

fifteen allegedly defamatory statements, seven of which plaintiffs
argue constitute defamation per se.

See Compl. ¶¶ 76(a)-(g)

(defamation per se); 4 93(a)-(h) (defamation). 5

Defendant argues

that none of these statements are actionable because they are
either protected opinions or are substantially true, and that some
of the statements are time-barred under the applicable statute of
limitations.

Mot. at 1-2.

The Court first addresses defendant’s

The allegedly defamatory per se statements are: “[LoanStreet] withheld $100k
in options that they promised me before I was hired”; “[Lampl] just pocketed
the options he promised me”; “[Lampl] defrauded me out of over $100k”; “[Lampl]
is a rich con man”; “[LoanStreet] is a fraudulent, exploitative mess”; “Look in
the mirror and ask yourselves how your loved ones would feel if they knew you
cheat people just to make your big piles of cash a little bigger”; and
“LoanStreet (NY) cheated me out of equity.” Compl. ¶¶ 76(a)-(g).
5 The allegedly defamatory statements are: “Based on Ian Lampl’s valuation goal
for the company, he defrauded me out of over $100k”; “They promised me
substantial equity with a standard one-year vesting cliff, then abruptly fired
me after 15 months of work and refused to grant me the options”; “After I
started, they told me that they actually meant 12 months after the next quarterly
board meeting, and I would only start to vest after 16 months. I asked them to
change it. They dragged their feet for months, pretending to work on it”; “After
15 months of praising my work, they abruptly fired me . . .”; “LoanStreet fires
people without warning . . .”; “The company has been operating with impunity
because they fire people without warning”; “After hiring employees with a
promise of unlimited PTO, management rolled out a PTO tracking tool that
explicitly capped PTO at 15 days per year”; and “A large percentage of LoanStreet
engineers when I was there were bootcamp grads.” Compl. ¶¶ 93(a)-(h).
4
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statute of limitations argument, followed by defendant’s arguments
on the merits.

The Court then considers whether the statements

constitute defamation per se or have caused plaintiffs special
harm.
1. Statute of Limitations
Defamation

claims

are

subject

limitations under New York law.

to

a

one-year

statute

See C.P.L.R. § 215(3).

of

Since the

Complaint was filed on July 21, 2021, plaintiffs cannot recover
for any statements made prior to July 21, 2020.

Defendant alleges

that the statements set forth in paragraphs 76(f) 6 and 93(h) 7 of
the Complaint are time-barred.

Mot. at 9 n.27.

To the contrary,

the statement in 76(f) was published on Reddit.com on June 19,
2021 and the statement in 93(h) was posted to Teamblind.com on
June 21, 2021.

See Declaration of Ryan Singer in Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Exs. D-E, ECF
No. 35.

To the extent defendant argues that these statements were

originally
period,

his

published

elsewhere

republication

restarts the clock.

of

outside
the

the

statements

one-year
on

new

lookback
websites

See Giuffre v. Dershowitz, 410 F. Supp. 3d

564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (rejecting argument that “once a defendant
“Look in the mirror and ask yourselves how your loved ones would feel if they
knew you cheat people just to make your big piles of cash a little bigger.”
7 “A large percentage of LoanStreet engineers when I was there were bootcamp
grads.”
6
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makes a statement in a prominent place on the Internet, he can
proactively repeat that claim in new places on the Internet ad
infinitum and remain immune from suit”) (emphasis in original).
Accordingly,

none

of

the

allegedly

defamatory

statements

are

untimely.
2. Opinion
A threshold question in any defamation action is whether the
statements at issue assert facts or opinions.

“Since falsity is

a necessary element of a defamation cause of action and only
‘facts' are capable of being proven false, ‘it follows that only
statements

alleging

defamation action.’”
152-153

(N.Y.

omitted).

1993)

facts

can

properly

be

the

subject

of

a

Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146,
(internal

quotation

marks

and

citation

As such, “[e]xpressions of opinion, as opposed to

assertions of fact, are deemed privileged and, no matter how
offensive, cannot be the subject of an action for defamation.”
Mann v. Abel, 10 N.Y.3d 271, 276 (N.Y. 2008).
is

opinion

or

rhetorical

hyperbole

as

“Whether a statement

opposed

representation is a question of law for the court.”

to

a

factual

Restis v. Am.

Coal. Against Nuclear Iran, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 705, 718 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (quoting Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 224
(2d Cir. 1985)).
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To determine whether a given statement is actionable, courts
consider three factors:
(1) whether the specific language in issue has a precise
meaning which is readily understood; (2) whether the
statements are capable of being proven true or false;
and (3) whether either the full context of the
communication in which the statement appears or the
broader social context and surrounding circumstances are
such as to signal readers or listeners that what is being
read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.
Wexler v. Dorsey & whitney LLP, 815 F. App’x 618, 621 (2d Cir.
2020) (quoting Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46, 51 (N.Y. 1995)).
In conducting this analysis, the overarching “inquiry is whether
a reasonable listener is likely to have understood the statements
as conveying provable facts about the plaintiff.”

Torain v. Liu,

279 F. App’x 46, 46 (2d Cir. 2008).
Not all opinions are immune from liability, however.

The law

distinguishes between non-actionable “pure opinions” and other
statements of opinion that are capable of defamatory meaning.

A

statement is a “pure opinion” if it is either “accompanied by a
recitation of the facts upon which it is based” or “does not imply
that it is based upon undisclosed facts.”

Biro v. Conde Naste,

883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Steinhilber v.
Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 289 (N.Y. 1986)).

But a statement of

opinion that “implies that it is based on facts that support the
opinion, which are unknown to persons reading or hearing it, is an
-12-
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actionable ‘mixed opinion.’”

Restis, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 719

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Likewise, if

“the facts upon which an opinion is based are set forth for the
reader, and the plaintiff alleges that both the opinion and the
facts upon which it is based are false, the opinion and facts may
form the basis of the defamation claim.”

Id. (emphasis added).

The bulk of the statements at issue here center on defendant’s
accusation
$100,000

that

in

plaintiffs

stock

unlawfully

options.

The

withheld

other

from

allegedly

defendant
defamatory

statements relate to plaintiffs’ hiring and firing practices. None
of them are pure opinion.

To start, most of the statements are

likely to be understood by a reasonable listener as conveying
provable facts. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 76(a) (“[LoanStreet] withheld
$100k in options that they promised me before I was hired.”); 76(c)
(“Lampl] defrauded me out of over $100k.”); 93(b) (“They promised
me substantial equity with a standard one-year vesting cliff, then
abruptly fired me after 15 months of work and refused to grant me
the

options.”).

Additionally,

although

defendant

argues

otherwise, his purported statements of opinion are not accompanied
by a full recitation of the facts.

In telling his side of the

story, he omits key information, such as the precise terms of his
stock option agreement and the dates on which he was granted the
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options.

In doing so, defendant implies that such facts support

his position when, according to the Complaint, they patently do
not.

Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.
Furthermore, when read in the full context of the posts, as

defendant urges the Court to do, it is clear that even the most
vitriolic of the bunch — remarks such as, “[Lampl] is a rich con
man” and “[LoanStreet] is a fraudulent, exploitative mess” — relate
to the specific accusation that LoanStreet and Lampl defrauded
defendant by unlawfully withholding $100,000 in stock options.
Compl.

¶¶

76(d)-(e).

These

are

not

the

type

of

“[l]oose,

figurative or hyperbolic statements” entitled to protection as
expressions of pure opinion.

Dillon v. City of New York, 704

N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).

Rather, they “are grounded

in assertions of fact about [p]laintiffs’ business activities and
are not framed in hyperbole.”

Restis, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 721; see

Levy v. Nissani, 115 N.Y.S.3d 418, 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)
(holding

statements

that

individuals

were

“scammers,”

“con

artists,” and “thieves,” “can readily be proven true or false and,
given the tone and overall context in which the statements were
made, signaled to the average listener that the plaintiff was
conveying facts about [the individuals]”).

Where, as here, “the

criticism takes the form of accusations of criminal or unethical
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conduct, or derogation of professional integrity in terms subject
to factual verification, the borderline between fact and opinion
has been crossed.”

Trump v. Chi. Tribune Co., 616 F. Supp. 1434,

1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
While it is possible that a reader could construe defendant’s
posts as the mere rantings of a disgruntled ex-employee who was
not literally defrauded by his company, at the motion to dismiss
stage, the Court need only consider “whether any reading of the
complaint supports the defamation claim.”

Davis v. Boeheim, 24

N.Y.3d 262, 272 (N.Y. 2014) (emphasis added).
may

well

be

that

the

challenged

“Thus, although it

statements

are

subject

to

[defendant’s] interpretation[,] the motion to dismiss must be
denied if the communication at issue, taking the words in their
ordinary

meaning

defamatory

and

in

connotation.”

context,
Id.

is

also

(internal

alterations, and citation omitted).

susceptible
quotation

to

a

marks,

At worst, the allegedly

defamatory statements include opinions and facts, both of which
plaintiffs contest.
dismiss.

This is sufficient to survive a motion to

See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348,

377 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[W]here the plaintiff alleges that both the
opinions and the facts are false, a motion to dismiss should not
be

granted,

and

the

plaintiff

may

-15-
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statements of fact and opinion.”) (citing Silsdorf v. Levine, 59
N.Y.2d 8, 10, 14-15 (N.Y. 1983)).
Finally, this analysis does not change simply because the
statements at issue were posted on online platforms. “Web content,
like all content, must be assessed on a case by case basis.”

Eros

Intern. PLC v. Mangrove Partners, No. 653096/2017, 2019 WL 1129196,
at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 8, 2019), aff’d, 140 N.Y.S.3d 518 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2021).

“Online commentary is just as capable as print

or broadcast media of inflicting the kinds of harm the defamation
laws

are

designed

to

protect

against.

Indeed,

online

communications can spread more quickly, and to all corners of the
world, than can print or broadcast media statements.”

Id.; see

Solstein v. Mirra, 488 F. Supp. 3d 86, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (denying
motion

to

dismiss

allegedly

defamatory

statements

posted

on

Facebook); Zuckerbrot v. Lande, 167 N.Y.S.3d 313, 339 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.

2022)

(denying

motion

to

statements posted on Instagram).

dismiss

allegedly

defamatory

Here, defendant posted his

statements on websites that seek to gather legitimate reviews about
companies

(Glassdoor.com

and

Teamblind.com),

as

well

as

on

Reddit.com — the so-called “front page of the Internet” — which is
frequented by hundreds of millions of active

monthly users. 8

David Curry, Reddit Revenue and Usage Statistics (2022), BUSINESS OF APPS,
https://www.businessofapps.com/data/reddit8
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Defendant then asked users to “follow [his] link and mark it as
helpful so that the message is amplified and as many people are
warned as possible.”

Compl. ¶ 42.

Defendant deliberately and

strategically utilized the Internet to spread statements capable
of defamatory meaning.

Defendant cannot now hide under the cloak

of cyberspace to escape liability.

For the foregoing reasons, the

Court rejects defendant’s attempt to characterize his statements
as non-actionable opinion.
3. Truth
Even if a statement is capable of defamatory meaning, a cause
of action for defamation will not lie if the statement is true or
“substantially true.”

See Jewell, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (“[T]ruth

is an absolute, unqualified defense to a civil defamation action.”)
(quoting Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 301 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987)).

“A statement is

substantially true if the statement would not ‘have a different
effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth
would have produced.’”

Id. (quoting Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266

N.Y. 19, 23 (N.Y. 1934)).

“Despite truth often being framed as a

defense to [defamation], the burden of proving the falsity of a
statement rests with the plaintiff.”

Leidig v. BuzzFeed, Inc.,

statistics/#:~:text=TechCrunch%2C%20The%20Information,Reddit%20users,its%20ad%20package%20in%202021 (last updated July 13, 2022).
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371 F. Supp. 3d 134, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

To survive a motion to

dismiss, a plaintiff must “plead facts that, if proven, would allow
a reasonable person to consider the statement false.”

Tannerite

Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Grp., a division of NBCUniversal
Media, LLC, 864 F.3d 236, 247 (2d Cir. 2017); see 1 Law of
Defamation § 5:11 (2d ed.) (“In establishing falsehood, a plaintiff
must do more than make broad unsupported assertions. A plaintiff
must identify specific statements and plead, and be prepared to
prove, their falsity.”).
Plaintiffs
defendant’s

have

sufficiently

statements

related

to

alleged
his

stock

the

falsity

options. 9

of
The

Complaint alleges that under LoanStreet’s stock option agreement,
“the initial portion of [defendant’s] stock options would vest and
become

exercisable

on

the

first

anniversary

of

his

vesting

commencement date, provided he continued to be employed by the
company.”

Compl. ¶ 19.

The Complaint further alleges that

defendant received his first grant of options on July 22, 2019 and
a second grant on January 15, 2020, and that “[e]ach option grant
had

its

own

vesting

schedule.”

Id.

¶

20.

If

defendant’s

termination on June 12, 2020 occurred before the first anniversary
of his vesting commencement date, none of his stock options would
Such statements are set forth in paragraphs 73(a)-(g) and 93(a)-(b) of the
Complaint.

9
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have vested, so he would not have been entitled to any equity
compensation.

Plaintiffs’ allegations are thus sufficient to

challenge

truth

the

of

defendant’s

statements

set

forth

in

paragraphs 73(a)-(g) and 93(a)-(b) of the Complaint.
However, with respect to defendant’s statements regarding
plaintiffs’ hiring and firing practices, plaintiffs have failed to
satisfy their burden. 10

Specifically, although plaintiffs allege

that defendant was fired for cause, see Compl. ¶ 27, they make no
mention of whether defendant received warnings before he was
terminated, a recurring theme in defendant’s posts. See, e.g.,
Compl. ¶¶ 93(d) (“After 15 months of praising my work, they
abruptly fired me . . .”); 93(e) (“LoanStreet fires people without
warning . . .”); 93(f) (“The company has been operating with
impunity because they fire people without warning”).
Nor do plaintiffs refute defendant’s statements regarding the
calculation of the vesting period, id. ¶¶ 93(c), the change in PTO
policy, id. ¶ 93(g), or the experience level of the Company’s
engineers, id. ¶ 93(h).

In their opposition brief, plaintiffs

state that they have “pled and intend[] to show” that defendant’s
statements regarding plaintiffs’ employment practices are false,
but cite only to the allegation in the Complaint that defendant’s

10

Such statements are set forth in paragraphs 93(c)-(h) of the Complaint.
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“statements contain false assertions of fact.”
Compl. ¶ 93.
without

any

Opp. at 13; see

The mere allegation that a statement is false,
supporting

detail

whatsoever,

is

insufficient

to

establish falsity.

See Goldman v. Reddington, 417 F. Supp. 3d

163,

2019)

171

(E.D.N.Y.

(“To

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss,

plaintiffs must do more than ‘perfunctorily state that a statement
is false.’”) (quoting Cabello-Rondon v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., No.
16 Civ. 3346 (KBF), 2017 WL 3531551, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16,
2017), aff’d, 720 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2018)).

Accordingly,

defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted without prejudice with
respect to the statements in paragraphs 93(c)–(h).

The Court

grants plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint to replead
these claims.
4. Special Damages and Defamation Per Se
As the final step in this analysis, plaintiffs must show that
the allegedly defamatory statements caused “special damage” or
else constitute defamation per se, for which no showing of harm is
required.

See Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters., Inc., 209 F.3d

163, 180 (2d Cir. 2000); Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 434335 (N.Y. 1992).
“Special damages consist of ‘the loss of something having
economic or pecuniary value[,]’ which ‘must flow directly from the
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injury to reputation caused by the defamation.’”

Matherson v.

Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds
by Laguerre v. Maurice, 192 A.D.3d 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).

In

the Complaint, plaintiffs allege that they have “suffered actual
and special damages” as a result of defendant’s statements, Compl.
¶ 94, such as the “loss of current and/or future clients and
employees,” id. ¶ 101; see also id. ¶ 62 (“As a direct and proximate
result of the foregoing defamatory statements and tortious actions
of [defendant], Plaintiffs have sustained, and will continue to
sustain, immediate and irreparable harm and injury, including, but
not limited to, damage to reputation, loss of profits, loss of
business relations with existing and future business prospects,
and loss of competitive business advantage, opportunity, and/or
expectancy.”).

These “nonspecific conclusory allegations,” which

do not quantify plaintiffs’ harm “with sufficient particularity to
identify actual losses,” “do not meet the stringent requirements
imposed for pleading special damages.”
235

(internal

Accordingly,

for

quotation
plaintiffs’

marks

Matherson, 100 A.D.2d at

and

defamation

citations
claim

to

omitted).
survive

the

motion to dismiss, the statements at issue must be defamatory
per se.
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Case 1:21-cv-06166-NRB Document 39 Filed 08/17/22 Page 22 of 36

Included among the limited categories of statements deemed to
be defamation per se are those that charge the plaintiff with a
“serious crime” or that “tend[] to injure the plaintiff in her or
his trade, business or profession.”

Nissani, 115 N.Y.S.3d at 420

(citing Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 435 (N.Y. 1992)).
Here, of the nine allegedly defamatory statements that have passed
muster thus far, seven are characterized in the Complaint as
defamation per se.
plaintiffs’
options.

See n.4, infra.

purported
The

two

misconduct

other

These statements all refer to
related

statements,

to

defendant’s

although

listed

stock

under

a

separate “defamation” heading in the Complaint, are of the same
ilk.

See Compl. ¶¶ 93(a) (“Based on Ian Lampl’s valuation goal

for the company, he defrauded me out of over $100k.”); 93(b) (“They
promised me substantial equity with a standard one-year vesting
cliff, then abruptly fired me after 15 months of work and refused
to grant me the options.”).
expressly

or

impliedly

All of these statements, which either

state

that

plaintiffs

“defrauded”

and

“cheated” defendant, constitute defamation per se.
Read in context, defendant’s statements would lead an average
reader to believe that LoanStreet and/or Lampl unlawfully withheld
or otherwise swindled him out of compensation duly owed to him.
Defendant’s

accusations

thus

charge

-22-
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commission of a serious crime and would tend to injure [them] in
their business by imputing ‘fraud, dishonesty, misconduct, or
unfitness in conducting their profession.’”

Nissani, 115 N.Y.S.3d

at 422 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Celle, 209 F.3d at 180 (“[W]here a statement impugns the basic
integrity

or

creditworthiness

of

a

business,

an

action

for

defamation lies and injury is conclusively presumed.”) (quoting
Ruder & Finn Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 52 N.Y.2d 663, 670 (N.Y.
1981)); Yesner v. Spinner, 765 F. Supp. 48, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
(“It has long been the law in New York that a defamatory statement
that is a direct attack upon the business, trade or profession of
the plaintiff is considered defamation per se[.]”).
plaintiffs

have

sufficiently

pleaded

defamation

Accordingly,
per

se

with

respect to the statements related to defendant’s options.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ defamation claims is granted with respect to the
statements in paragraphs 93(c)-(h) of the Complaint, and denied
with respect to the statements in 76(a)-(g) and 93(a)-(b).
B.

Injurious Falsehood
Plaintiffs’ next cause of action is for injurious falsehood,

a close cousin to defamation.

“The elements of an injurious

falsehoods claim are: (1) falsity of the alleged statements; (2)
publication

to

a

third

person;
-23-
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and

(4)
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damages.”

Grayson v. Ressler & Ressler, 271 F. Supp. 3d 501, 518

(S.D.N.Y. 2017).
that

a

Injurious falsehood “differs from defamation in

defamatory

statement

impugns

the

basic

integrity

or

creditworthiness of a business while an injurious falsehood is
confined to denigrating the quality of the plaintiff’s business’s
goods or services.”

Id.

Plaintiffs’ injurious falsehood claim relates to the same set
of statements and alleged harm giving rise to their defamation
claims.
“must

be

claims.

See Compl. ¶ 103.
dismissed
Enigma,

194

as

As such, the injurious falsehood claim

duplicative

F.

Supp.

3d

of”
263,

plaintiff’s
291

defamation

(S.D.N.Y.

2016)

(collecting cases); see Perez v. Violence Intervention Program,
984 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (stating injurious
falsehood claim “should have been dismissed as duplicative of the
defamation claim, as [it] allege[s] no new facts and seek[s] no
distinct damages from the defamation claim”).
Furthermore, the statements at issue patently impugn the
reputation of plaintiffs’ business, not the “condition, value or
quality of [plaintiffs’] product or property.”

Angio-Medical

Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 720 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
In their opposition, plaintiffs attempt to avert this outcome by
identifying one other excerpt from defendant’s statements that
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purportedly illustrates defendant’s product disparagement.

In

defendant’s June 19, 2021 post on Reddit.com, he wrote:
The only problem I was aware of was that the CTO Larry
Adams was upset with me because I discovered and fixed
a critical error in code written by one of his favorite
engineers. The engineer didn’t remember why he had made
the change and refused to help me investigate why tests
were failing.
Compl. ¶ 42; see Opp. at 18.

Noting that at one point there had

been an error in plaintiffs’ software, which error was then fixed,
is far too benign to sustain this cause of action.
Even if that issue were not dispositive, plaintiffs face
additional hurdles with respect to falsity and special damages.
Plaintiffs make no showing that defendant’s statement regarding
the software error was false.

Nor do plaintiffs plead special

damages with sufficient particularity.

See Kasada, Inc. v. Access

Cap., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8893 (GBD), 2004 WL 2903776, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2004) (noting “the requirement of pleading and
proving special damages is applied strictly,” so “a motion to
dismiss a claim of injurious falsehood may be granted for failure
to allege special damages with the requisite specificity”); Rall
v. Hellman, 726 N.Y.S.2d 629, 632 (N.Y. 2001) (concluding complaint
was deficient because it failed to identify special damages with
sufficient

particularity).

As

with

their

defamation

claims,

plaintiffs baldly state that defendant’s “misconduct has, at a
-25-
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minimum, caused Plaintiffs to suffer pecuniary losses with respect
to the loss of business with certain companies,” as well as
“pecuniary losses with respect to the money they have had to spend
to counteract [defendant’s] defamatory statements and damaging
actions, including without limitation, the fees paid to their
attorneys to prepare this complaint and litigate this action.”
Compl. ¶¶ 107-108.

This is insufficient.

See Fashion Boutique of

Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 59 (2d Cir.
2002) (“Where loss of customers constitutes the alleged special
damages, the individuals ‘who ceased to be customers, or who
refused

to

purchase,

must

be

named’

and

the

exact

damages

itemized.”) (quoting Drug Research Corp. v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 7
N.Y.2d 435, 441-42 (N.Y. 1960)).
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint fails to state a
claim for injurious falsehood and defendant’s motion to dismiss
this cause of action is granted.
C.

Unfair Competition
Finally, the Complaint asserts causes of action for unfair

competition and false designation of origin under Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), and New York common
law.

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits the “use[] in

commerce” of any term or false designation of origin “which is
likely to cause confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection,
-26-
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or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial

activities

by

another

person.”

15

U.S.C.

§

1125(a)(1)(A).
A claim of unfair competition under the Lanham Act is governed
by a “two-prong test.”

Soter Techs., LLC v. IP Video Corp., 523

F. Supp. 3d 389, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

“The test looks first to

whether the plaintiff’s mark is entitled to protection, and second
to whether defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumers
confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of the defendant’s
goods.”

Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471,

486 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335
F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2003).

In addition, a plaintiff must

establish that the defendant made “use[] in commerce” of the
protected mark.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).

These same standards

apply to unfair competition claims under New York common law,
“except that New York law requires an additional showing of bad
faith.”

Soter, 523 F. Supp. 3d at 397 (internal quotation marks,

alteration, and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs’ unfair competition claims arise from defendant’s
purchase

of

Google

advertisements

that

displayed

LoanStreet’s

registered trademark, and which would appear on users’ screens
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when they searched for “LoanStreet” in Google’s search engine.
Below is a sampling of the ads:

Compl. ¶ 49.

Defendant does not dispute that the LoanStreet

trademark is entitled to protection.

Rather, defendant argues

that his purchase of these advertisements did not constitute a
“use in commerce” of the mark, and that any such use was not likely
to cause confusion.
1. Use in Commerce
To state a claim for unfair competition, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant made “use in commerce” of its mark.
Section 1127 of the Lanham Act sets forth a definition of “use in
commerce” that applies to unfair competition claims under Section
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1125(a)(1)(A). 11

15 U.S.C. § 1127(2); see 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.

WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005).

Section 1127

provides in relevant part that “a mark shall be deemed to be in
use in commerce . . . on services when it is used or displayed in
the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered
in commerce . . . .”

15 U.S.C. § 1127(2).

It is undisputed that defendant purchased advertisements via
Google’s

advertising

LoanStreet name. 12

platform

that

publicly

displayed

the

Defendant nevertheless argues that because he

did not use the LoanStreet trademark in connection with any paid
services or on any advertisements for services that he himself was
promoting, he did not use plaintiffs’ trademark in commerce.
The narrow reading of “use in commerce” that defendant urges
is inconsistent with the body of case law recognizing that the
term is “broad and has a sweeping reach.” Planned Parenthood Fed’n
of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313, at
In 1-800 Contacts, the Second Circuit held that Section 1127 applied to unfair
competition claims under the Lanham Act. 414 F.3d at 409. Four years later,
in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second
Circuit cast doubt on that conclusion in a special appendix to its opinion, but
stopped short of overruling 1-800 Contacts. Accordingly, 1-800-Contacts remains
binding precedent on this Court. For a more in-depth analysis of the interplay
between 1-800-Contacts and Rescuecom, see Can’t Live Without It, LLC v. ETS
Express, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 3d 400, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
12
However, defendant disputes the characterization of these displays as
“advertisements.” Mot. at 19. Defendant’s quibble is unconvincing. He does
not deny that he bought the displays from Google’s advertising platform, and
the word “Ad” appears in the top left corner of each example. In any event,
whether they are referred to as advertisements or something else makes no
difference to the analysis.
11
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*3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,
344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952)), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998); see
OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Mag., Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 185
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he scope of [the] term ‘use in commerce’ . .
. is broad.”).

Indeed, the courts in this Circuit have repeatedly

held that a plaintiff may state a claim under the Lanham Act where
the defendant (1) interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to offer
its own commercial services, and/or (2) used the Internet.

See,

e.g., Adecco USA, Inc. v. Staffworks, Inc., No. 620 Civ. 744 (MAD),
2021

WL

2593304,

at

*18

(N.D.N.Y.

June

23,

2021)

(holding

defendants’ display of plaintiff’s trademark on a Facebook page
constituted a use in commerce because, inter alia, it interfered
with plaintiff’s ability to offer its own services); C=Holdings
B.V. v. Asiarim Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 223, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“[C]ourts

have

found

that

the

‘in

commerce’

requirement

is

satisfied where the infringing act had an adverse effect on the
plaintiff’s ability to participate in interstate commerce. Use of
the Internet also suffices.”) (citation omitted); World Wrestling
Fed’n Entmt., Inc. v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514, 528 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding statements posted online used plaintiff’s trademark
in commerce because, inter alia, “defendants’ conduct affects the
[plaintiff’s] ability to attract and retain consumers, sponsors,
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and advertisers of its products”); Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL
133313 at *3; OBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 185-86.
The

Complaint

implicates

both

of

these

circumstances.

Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s purchase of the LoanStreet
trademark as a Google keyword was “willful with the deliberate
intent to . . . divert potential sales of LoanStreet services, as
well as potential new hires, away from LoanStreet.”

Compl. ¶ 117;

see also Opp. at 20 (asserting defendant “purchased Google Ads
using the trademark ‘LoanStreet’ with the express purpose of
diverting Internet users away from LoanStreet’s website and to his
own posts”) (citing Compl. ¶¶ 51-54).

At the motion to dismiss

stage, these allegations suffice to demonstrate that defendant’s
conduct interfered with plaintiffs’ ability to attract and retain
clients and employees, thus constituting a “use in commerce.”
Defendant’s “use of the Internet also satisfie[s] the Lanham Act’s
‘in commerce’ requirement.”
The

primary

Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 529.

case

upon

which

defendant

relies,

FragranceNet.com v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545
(E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2007), is factually distinguishable.
FragranceNet,

as

here,

the

defendant

used

the

While in

plaintiff’s

trademark as a keyword in search engines to trigger the display of
the defendant’s content when users searched for the plaintiff’s
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company, the advertisement that was then shown to users did not
include the plaintiff’s name.

Rather, it simply revealed a link

to the defendant’s own website.

Id. at 550.

In concluding that

this did not constitute a “use in commerce,” the FragranceNet Court
emphasized that “the use of plaintiff’s trademark is strictly
internal”

and

“[p]laintiff

has

not

alleged

defendant’s display of plaintiff’s mark.”

claims

based

on

Id. at 550, 552; see

Adecco, 2021 WL 2593304 at *17 (“The determinative factor in
FragranceNet, was that the trademark was used only in internal
data and metatags which were never displayed to consumers.”).

By

contrast, here, not only did defendant use plaintiffs’ trademark
as

a

keyword

incorporated

to

trigger

plaintiffs’

its

advertisements,

trademark

into

advertisement that was publicly displayed.

the

but
text

he
of

also
the

As such, plaintiffs’

unfair competition claims arise directly from defendant’s external
display of plaintiffs’ mark to potential consumers.

Defendant’s

conduct thus constitutes a “use in commerce.”
2. Likelihood of Confusion
Lastly, plaintiffs must allege that defendant’s use of their
mark was likely to cause confusion.

The likelihood of confusion

test requires that a court evaluate the well-established Polaroid
factors:

-32-

Case 1:21-cv-06166-NRB Document 39 Filed 08/17/22 Page 33 of 36

(1) strength of plaintiff’s mark, (2) similarity of
competing marks, (3) competitive proximity of the
products, (4) likelihood that plaintiff will ‘bridge the
gap’ and offer a product like defendants’ product, (5)
actual confusion, (6) defendants’ good faith, (7)
quality of defendants’ product, and (8) sophistication
of the buyers.
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d
402, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs.
Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
820 (1961)). “Application of the Polaroid test is ‘not mechanical,
but rather, focuses on the ultimate question of whether, looking
at the products in their totality, consumers are likely to be
confused.’”

Soter, 523 F. Supp. 3d at 405 (quoting Star Indus.,

Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005)).
The first and second factors plainly favor plaintiffs, as
defendant does not dispute the strength of plaintiffs’ mark and
defendant copied the trademark verbatim.

As to proximity and

competitiveness, it is true that defendant does not have his own
mark and is not offering a good or service.

See Mot. at 20.

However, the “plaintiff’s web site and defendant’s web site are
both on the Internet, [so] the parties are vying for users in the
same ‘market,’” Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313 at *8, using
the exact same mark.
“LoanStreet”

as

the

Indeed, plaintiffs allege that by using
keyword
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advertisements, defendant has attempted to divert the very users
seeking out the real LoanStreet.

See Compl. ¶ 117 (“[Defendant’s]

acts are willful with the deliberate intent to trade on the
goodwill

of

the

Mark,

cause

confusion

and

deception

in

the

marketplace, and divert potential sales of LoanStreet services, as
well potential new hires, away from LoanStreet.”).
of

competitive

proximity

.

.

.

increases

the

This “degree
likelihood

of

confusion among Internet uses.” Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313
at *8.

Where, as here, the parties are vying for users in the

same “market,” “there is no need to consider whether plaintiff
will bridge the gap between the markets,” the fourth Polaroid
factor.

Id.

(citing

Paddington

Corp.

v.

Attiki

Importers

&

Distributors, Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1993)).
The fifth factor, however, is a closer call.

Plaintiffs

allege that defendant’s
unauthorized use in commerce of the [LoanStreet] mark .
. . is likely to deceive would-be consumers of
LoanStreet’s services as well as prospective employees,
as to the origin, source, sponsorship, or affiliation,
and is likely to cause these same individuals to believe,
contrary to fact, that [defendant] is in some way
affiliated, sponsored by, or otherwise endorsed by
LoanStreet when he is not.
Compl. ¶ 118.
The

The Court is not so sure.

defendant’s

advertisements

bear

titles

such

as

“LoanStreet horror story – LoanStreet careers,” and “LoanStreet
-34-
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horror story – ‘a terrible place to work,’” show excerpts of
defendant’s disparaging posts, and display links to Reddit.com.
Compl. ¶ 49.

These advertisements are similar to the content at

issue in Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Sup. 2d 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
where the defendant’s advertisements bore the heading “Manhattan
Interior

Design

description

Scam—Bihari

underneath

the

Interiors”

title:

‘This

with

“the

following

site

deals

with

the

problems experienced when hiring a New York City (Manhattan)
designer.’”
an

Internet

As the Bihari court concluded, it seems unlikely that
user

who

reads

defendant’s

advertisements

would

believe that they belong to or are endorsed by plaintiffs.
Still, there may be some credence to plaintiffs’ argument
that
[w]hen a consumer searches for LoanStreet and is
immediately presented with ads using the phrase
‘LoanStreet,’ under the search term ‘LoanStreet,’ it
creates confusion as a consequence of the expectation
that Google returns businesses related to the search
term
(which
because
of
LoanStreet’s
inherently
distinctive Mark increases the likelihood of association
with the returned search results).
Compl. ¶ 54.

At a minimum, this allegation raises an issue of

fact that would be premature to resolve at this stage, especially
given that the remainder of the Polaroid factors favor plaintiffs
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at least preliminarily. 13

See Merck, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 412

(stating the likelihood of confusion test “is a fact-intensive
analysis that ordinarily does not lend itself to a motion to
dismiss”) (citing Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir.
1998)).

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

unfair competition claims is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is
granted in part and denied in part.

The Clerk of Court is

respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at ECF No.
25.

If

plaintiffs

decide

to

replead

as

permitted

herein,

plaintiffs should submit their amended complaint within 30 days.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New York
August 17, 2022
____________________________
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In addition to the factors analyzed above, the defendant patently did not use
LoanStreet’s trademark in good faith. Upon his termination, defendant vowed
that he would “be doing [his] best to warn all potential future employees to
avoid LoanStreet,” Compl. ¶ 30, and by his own admission, defendant sought to
“amplif[y]” his negative comments and warn “as many people . . . as possible”
about plaintiffs’ purported misconduct, Compl. ¶ 42. For the same reasons, the
Court concludes that plaintiffs also satisfied the showing of bad faith required
to state a claim for unfair competition under New York state law.
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